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Hard Choices: American Oil Import Dependence
and Oil Import Fees
I. INTRODUCTION: THE RISE OF AMERICAN OIL DEPENDENCE
Over the past forty years, the United States has become increasingly
dependent on imported oil. In 1990, nearly forty-five percent of the
oil consumed in the U.S. came from foreign wells. Oil is of vital impor-
tance to industry, manufacturing, and transportation, while import de-
pendence presents foreign policy, national security, and economic
concerns.
The supply of affordable foreign oil was important to developing in-
dustrial society, and today it is an indispensable element of the global
economy. The abundant supply of cheap foreign oil has conferred many
benefits upon the United States. However, dependence on imported oil
also presents many serious problems. As a policy, long term dependence
on oil is unwise because it is a finite resource. In the short term, substan-
tial dependence on imported oil increases the likelihood of oil supply dis-
ruptions, and is a threat to national security. A significant disruption of
supply would cause increased unemployment and inflation, and would
severely hamper American economic performance.
An oil import fee could help reduce U.S. dependence on imported
oil. Such a fee would increase oil prices, encouraging domestic oil pro-
duction. Increased oil prices would have negative economic effects.
However, the ill effects of a phased in, anticipated oil import fee are pref-
erable to the severe consequences of a sudden disruption in oil supply.
Import dependence is an extremely difficult problem, and requires that
some hard choices be made to increase American energy independence.
A. The Early Years
Oil is a cornerstone of modern industrial society. Indispensable to
industry and manufacturing, it allows us to be extremely mobile.1 De-
l Christopher Falvin, Detroit" America's Best Source of Oil, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1990, at
C13. Transportation constitutes nearly two-thirds of oil consumption in the United States.
Automobiles alone consume 40% of U.S. oil, while another 20% is used in transportation related
industries such as air travel and trucking. I&i See also, Thomas W. Lippman, The Monkey That
Won't Get Off Our Back, WASH. PoST, Oct. 1-7, 1990, at 22 (Nat'l Week. Ed.) [hereinafter Lipp-
man]. See also, Energy Policy Congressional Research Service, Energy Policy at 5 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter Energy Policy].
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pendence on oil, and the numerous benefits which flow from its abundant
supply, began with the Industrial Revolution. According to one author,
it is only in the last 125 years that mankind has entered the Age of Petro-
leum.2 By the end of the 19th century, oil was an important commodity
of international trade, and a significant source of revenue for the United
States, which was exporting large quantities of oil.3
As commercial enterprise flourished, the leading industrial nations
became increasingly dependent on imported oil, however they found
their domestic supplies insufficient to meet the growing demand.' Suffi-
cient supply of imported oil was of vital importance to the emerging in-
dustrial societies.5 Levels of oil imports increased consistently
throughout the first half of the 20th century, and by the end of World
War II, the United States was a net importer of petroleum.6 Over the
ensuing forty years, this trend has persisted as the United States has
grown increasingly dependent on foreign oil. By the 1950s, oil had be-
come an indispensable element of international trade and the world had
entered "the era of multilateral energy interdependence." 7
B. Effects of Import Dependence
The emergence of oil as a premium energy source of industrial soci-
ety has created, in addition to its many benefits, a multitude of problems
for oil dependent importing countries. One of the most pervasive
problems inherent with oil dependence is that as a natural resource, it is
finite. More than a mere theoretical finitude, depletion of the supply is
well within contemporary capability. Estimates of when exhaustion will
occur vary, yet all but the most optimistic ones predict the barrel will be
dry by the mid-twenty first century.8 The immediate implications of oil
2 EDWARD W. CHESTER, UNITED STATES OIL POLICY AND DIPLOMACY 3 (1983). The first
American petroleum company, the Pennsylvania Rock Oil Company, was organized on December
30, 1854. Id
3 Id. By the early 1880s, oil exports ranked fourth in value behind cotton, breadstuffs and
provisions. Id.
4 JOSEPHS S. SZYLIOWICZ & BARD E. O'NEILL, THE ENERGY CRISIS AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY 142-43 (JOSEPHS S. SZYLIOWICZ & BARD E. O'NEILL eds. 1975) [hereinafter SzYI.IowIcz
& O'NEILL]. Western Europe and Japan became heavily dependent on imported oil, while the
United States remained a relatively low importer. By 1960, Europe was importing over 90% of its
oil. Id.
5 ABBAS ALNASRAWI, OPEC IN A CHANGING WORLD ECONOMY 90 (1985). See also, George
Bush, Why We Are in the Gulf, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 26, 1990, at 29.
6 CHESTER, supra note 2, at 21. See also, SZYLIOWICZ & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 142. See
also, RICHARD B. MANCKE, SQUEAKING BY: U.S. ENERGY POLICY SINCE THE EMBARGO, (1976).
7 SZYLIOWICZ & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 142.
8 John Norton Moore, Foreign Policy Dimensions of the Crisis in Oil, 17 WILLAMETrE L. REv.
111, 113 (1980) (Predicting that worldwide production could begin to drop as soon as the year
2000). See also, ARABINDA GHOSH, OPEC, THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY, AND UNITED STATES
ENERGY POLICY 109 (1983) (Venezuela will run out of oil in the next ten years; Algeria within
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dependence are equally serious. Supply disruptions of imported oil and
the resultant shortages threaten every oil dependent economy.
The challenge to find new resources to adequately meet future en-
ergy demand is one of the most difficult and pressing problems mankind
has ever faced.9 The reality of the world's finite oil supply, and the fact
that a substantial amount of the remaining world oil reserves are located
in a militarily and politically insecure region I° both give compelling pol-
icy arguments for reducing American dependence on imported oil. From
a political standpoint, dependence on foreign oil transforms energy pol-
icy into an essential factor of foreign policy.1 From an economic stand-
point, continued (or increased) dependence will exacerbate the already
substantial transfers of wealth from the importing countries to the ex-
porting countries. 2 From a strategic standpoint, it is poor policy to rely
so significantly for oil on an insecure source, insofar as it increases the
likelihood of substantial interruptions of supply. 3 Recognition of such a
danger has been an element of American energy policies for the last half
century.' 4 Noting the negative implications of import dependence, one
commentator has called imported oil "our drug of choice."' 5
C. Increased American Dependence
While the debate about imported oil has become more acute as
global dependence on oil has grown, concern over oil dependence is not a
new phenomenon. As early as the first World War, one author wrote
that "[i]t is doubtful whether future discoveries of oil within the United
fifteen years; and Kuwait, UAE, Iraq and Saudi Arabia will run out in 50-75 years). See also,
Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 3 (Current Middle Eastern oil reserves would last more than 100
years at current production rate of 6 billion barrels per year). See also, Thomas W. Lippman, Is This
Help in the Nick of Time, or More Coals for Newcastle?, WASH. POST, Oct. 22-28, 1990, at 15 (Nat'l
Week. Ed.) [hereinafter Nick of Time]. Saudi Arabia, already the world's largest oil exporter, has
recently made new discoveries of oil which could increase its reserves by 20%. If these estimates are
accurate, Saudi Arabia could produce oil at its current rate into the 22nd century. Id.
9 SzYLiowicz O'NEILL, supra note 4, at vii.
10 Gary Hart, Energy and National Security, 36 Rec. A. B. City N.Y. 280, 282 (1981) The
Middle-East nations are referred to as the Balkans of the 1980s. Id. See also, Robert J. Samuelson,
Tax Energy to Show Hussein We're Serious, WASH. PoST, Aug. 27-Sept. 2, 1990, at 28 (Nat'l Week.
Ed.) (The Iraqi takeover of Kuwait, if successful, would have given Iraq control of almost one-third
of world's oil reserves). See also, Still Not Serious About Energy, WASH. PoST, Feb. 18-24, 1991, at
29 (Nat'l Week. Ed.).
II SzyLIowicz & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 50.
12 JAMES M. GRIFFIN & DAVID J. TEECE, OPEC BEHAVIOR AND WORLD OIL PRICES 186
(1982) [hereinafter GRIFFIN & TEEcE].
13 SzYLIOwIcz & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 56.
14 MANCKE, supra note 6, at 4-5. The goal of reducing dependence on militarily/politically
insecure sources has been one of the four goals of U.S. policy since the 1930s. Id
15 Lippman, supra note 1, at 22.
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States will keep pace with our consumption."16 Those doubts quickly
became reality. The years following World War II saw North America
shift from a net exporter of energy to a net importer.17
Whether due to a lack of leadership, or the lack of a comprehensive
plan to limit foreign oil dependence, today imports serve much more
than a supplementary purpose. In 1949 American oil producers adopted
the slogan "[i]mports to supplement but not to supplant."18 In 1955, due
to the increasing amounts of oil imports, the federal government asked
importers to limit the levels of imported oil on a voluntary basis, 9 and in
1957 a formal "Voluntary Oil Import Program" was instituted by Presi-
dent Eisenhower.20 The voluntary approach to limiting imports was un-
successful. As a result, the Eisenhower Administration, in 1959,
announced a mandatory limitation program, establishing ceilings for for-
eign oil imports.21
The flow of imported oil into the United States, as well as into Japan
and Western Europe, steadily increased through the 1960s and early
1970s. Combined Western European and Japanese crude imports in-
creased almost twofold between 1967-73, and American imports of crude
rose more than 150%.22 In 1970, 25% of the oil consumed in the United
States came from foreign wells,23 and the early years of that decade saw
American import dependence increase at nearly 30% annually.24
Between 1970-81, American crude oil imports more than tripled,
from 545 million barrels in 1970 to 1,763 million barrels in 1981.25 More
significantly, the proportion of oil imports to total U.S. oil supply in-
16 HERBERT FEIS, PETROLEUM AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 14 (1944).
17 HUSSEIN ABDALLAH, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL OIL WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO THE ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES 108-109 (1979).
This was largely due to increased oil imports. Imported oil made up only 6.3% of overall consump-
tion in 1952, but was up to 12% in 1956 and 21.3% in 1963. Id.
18 CHESTER, supra note 2, at 22.
19 Beverly Lawrence, A Primer On Oil Import Fees, 38 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 99, 104 (1989).
20 CHESTER, supra note 2, at 32.
21 Id. at 34-35 (Nationwide import levels were limited to the 1957 level of 480,000 barrels per
day). See also, Lawrence, supra note 19, at 104 (This oil import quota excluded Mexican and Cana-
dian Oil). See also, MANCKE, supra note 6, at 18 (Quotas restricting oil imports throughout the
1960's were costly to the United States without providing any real benefit, as no legitimate threat of
supply disruption existed).
22 NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTER, INC. OIL, DIVESTITURE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY 107 (1977) [hereinafter NSIC]. In 1973, imported oil represented 63% of total energy
resources in Western Europe, 85% of Japanese energy and 17% of American energy supplies. As
the proportion of imported oil to total oil supply was greatest in Japan, the degree of import depen-
dence was the most severe. Id
23 Hart, supra note 10, at 280.
24 MANCKE, supra note 6, at 18.
25 Edward E. Murphy & Mark McEnearney, Import Price Indexes for Crude Petroleum, 105
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 29, 29 (1982).
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creased as well; it constituted 16.4% of total supply in 1971 and 36.1%
in 1981.26 Today the import/supply ratio is even higher. In the first
eight and one half months of 1990, the United States imported approxi-
mately 45% of its oil needs.27
The 1973 oil embargo brought concern over foreign oil dependence
into the forefront. 28 American support of Israel in the Middle East war
prompted the oil producing and exporting countries to invoke the "oil
weapon. ' ' 29 The weapon was successfully used, as oil production was cut
and oil prices soared.30 Skyrocketing gas prices and long lines at the gas
pumps made many, both inside and outside of government, question the
propriety of continued American dependence on foreign oil.
During President Nixon's tenure, American oil imports rose more
than 150%.31 In the wake of the 1973 oil embargo, President Nixon
unveiled Project Independence, his plan to put the United States on the
road to energy self-sufficiency.32 In addition, the Federal Energy Agency
(FEA) was created to handle energy policy matters. 33 Despite an aggres-
sive energy plan, including federal fuel allocation programs, price con-
trols, and oil import fees, the end result of the Nixon administration's
energy policy was increased dependence on imported oil.34
President Ford imposed an oil import fee of $1 per barrel beginning
February 1, 1975, increasing to $2 per barrel in June of that year.35 In
addition to his attempt to reduce oil consumption through the per barrel
26 Id. at 29. At their peak in 1977, imports constituted 45.6% of total oil supply. The propor-
tion of imports to total supply is the important focus. As that proportion increases, so does the
degree of dependence. Id. See also, Thomas H. Lippman and Mark Potts, The Current Oil Shock is
Proving Less Electrifying, WASH. POsT, Nov. 26-Dec. 2, 1990, at 20 (Nat'l Week. Ed.) [hereinafter
Electrifying]. Victor S. Rezendes, energy issues director of the General Accounting Office, estimated
that oil will make up 40% of U.S. energy demands for some years to come. Id
27 FEDERAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Hearing of the Senate Energy and Natu-
ral Resources Committee, Oct. 2, 1990, at 2.
28 Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 1, (Predicting that the recent Gulf crisis will renew Congres-
sional interest in reducing dependence by utilizing alternative fuels, conservation, energy taxes and
oil import fees).
29 SzYLIowicz & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 184.
30 Id. at 185. See also, GHOSH, supra note 8, at 161. (Retail gas prices doubled almost
immediately).
31 NSIC, supra note 22 at 107.
32 GHOSH, supra note 8, at 163.
33 Id
34 GHOSH, supra note 8, at 163. See also, Moore, supra note 8, at 113 (Five years after Project
Independence was released, oil imports had risen, constituting 45% of American oil consumption).
See also, Lippman, supra note 1, at 22 (Nixon's Project Independence called the last "concerted
attempt by the federal government to eliminate oil imports"). See also, [Congressional Research
Service, (Libr. Cong. Oil) Import Fees (Taxes) For Deficit Reduction: Revenue and Economic Ef-
fects], at 2 (1989) [hereinafter OIF]. In 1973 there was a 10.5 cent per barrel tax on imported crude
oil. Id
35 Id. at 164. It was estimated that the $2/barrel fee would reduce oil imports by 800,000
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tariff, President Ford also introduced several measures designed to in-
crease domestic exploration and to encourage domestic production.36
Despite his ambitious intentions, disagreement between the Republican
President and the Democratic Congress prohibited the formulation of
any coherent national energy policy.37
President Jimmy Carter entered the office with oil imports at an all
time high, domestic production levels plummeting, and a staggering bill
for U.S. oil imports. 38 The Carter Administration replaced license fees
and customs duties currently in place with a scheme of oil import quo-
tas.39 In addition, the Crude Oil Equalization Tax (COET) was intro-
duced, with the hope that it, would reduce oil consumption by increasing
prices.4' The COET was proposed to operate within the framework of
existent oil price controls, but would permit the regulated price of newly
discovered oil to rise.4" By imposing a tax equal to the difference be-
tween world and domestic oil prices, it was believed that oil consumption
could be cut.42 However, President Carter was unable to sell his aggres-
sive energy plan to Congress, and like his predecessors, was unable to
formulate a long-term energy policy which would reduce import
dependence.43
Ronald Reagan's faith in the free market as a means of reducing
import dependence was made clear early in his presidency when he elimi-
nated the price control on domestic oil instituted by President Carter.'
Through the first half of 1981 this decentralization of domestic oil pric-
ing had the positive effect of increasing the amount of newly completed
oil wells.45 Over the long-term, however, Reagan administration policies
increased, rather than decreased, import dependence. 46 Many commen-
m/b/d. This per barrel tariff did not result in reduced imports, and was repealed in January 1976.
Id. at 174.
36 Id. at 164-165.
37 Id. at 164. One energy policy accomplishment of the Ford Presidency was the Energy Pol-
icy and Conservation Act of 1975, which created the strategic petroleum reserve. Id. at 169.
38 Id. at 176 (The 1977 tab for imported oil was $43 billion). See also, Murphy, supra note 25,
at 29 (In 1977, imports constituted 45.6% of U.S. supply).
39 GHOSH, supra note 8, at 177.
40 Id. at 177. This tax would raise the price of petroleum prices by 4-5 cents per gallon. The
COET was commonly known as the well-head tax. Id. at 179.
41 Id. at 177.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 182-184 (The Carter Administration did, however, enact several measures aimed at
energy conservation and conversion). See also, Electrifying, supra note 26, at 20. Despite the lack
of policy, American demand for refined petroleum products dropped 10% between 1978-80. Id.
44 GHosH, supra note 8, at 185.
45 Id. at 185. From January to June of 1981, new oil wells increased by 41% from 1980. Id
46 Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 4. Overall energy consumption increased during the 1980s,
largely due to the low oil prices of the 1980s. U.S. imports of energy nearly doubled from the levels
of the early 1980s. Id. at 5.
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tators have noted that President Bush's National Energy Strategy simi-
larly indicates his reliance in the free market as a means of reducing
import dependence.47
In 1977, nearly 40% of the oil consumed in the United States was
imported.48  Today import dependence is more severe, as oil demand
continues to rise,4 9 and domestic production continues to fall.5" In the
first six months of 1990, the United States imported in excess of 45% of
its oil.51
Even with the implementation of an aggressive energy policy aimed
at reducing import dependence, foreign oil will remain an indispensable
element of U.S. energy supply through the turn of the century.52
D. Foreign Policy and National Security Implications
In addition to increased prices and genuine energy shortages, the
1973 oil embargo demonstrated that oil import dependence has signifi-
cant foreign policy and national security implications and that exporting
nations have the power to affect international political stability.53 In a
more limited sense, import dependence transforms energy policy into an
element of foreign policy.54
The concentration of oil reserves in the Middle East region gives
those nations an amplified, albeit distorted, sense of importance in the
international community. The value of oil to the exporters is greater
than the market price per barrel. Oil is a political commodity,5" a
weapon which threatens the import dependent nations of the industrial-
ized world.
Effective use of "the oil weapon" enables exporting countries to af-
47 StillNot SeriousAbout Energy, WASH. POST, Feb. 18-24, 1991, at 29 (Nat'l Week. Ed.). The
Bush Administration has cut out the principle conservation measures of the Energy Strategy, and
has instead focused on increased domestic production as the way to reduce import dependence.
Referring to Bush's apparent faith in the free market, is stated that "Ideology is always the death of
sensible policy and particularly in a field as highly polarized as energy." Id.
48 NSIC, supra note 22, at 116.
49 INTERNAT'L ENERGY AGENCY, ANNUAL ENERGY REPORT 7 (1988) (American oil con-
sumption up 2.8% in 1988).
50 DOMESTIC OIL PRODUCTION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvICE, at 1 (1991) [hereinaf-
ter DOMESTIC] (Between 1985-89, domestic oil production was down 15%).
51 Federal Information Systems Corporation, Hearing of the Senate Energy and Natural Re-
sources Committee, Oct. 2, 1990, at 2 [hereinafter Hearings]. See also, McKie, Oil Imports: Is Any
Policy Possible?, 18 NAT. RESOURCES 1. 731, 733 (1978) (predicting a sharp rise in demand for
imported oil after 1990).
52 Margaret E. Kriz, Energy Crunch: Round 3, 22 NAT'L J. 2183, 2189 (1990).
53 SAM H. SCHURR ET AL., ENERGY IN AMERICA'S FUTURE 418 (1979) [hereinafter S.
SCHURR].
54 Bush, supra note 5, at 29. "Energy security is national security .. " National Security was
one of three reasons for U.S. involvement in the Gulf crisis. Id.
55 SzYIlOWICZ & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 74. See also, Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 6.
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fect the energy policy and foreign policy of the importing countries.
Clearly, American policies are affected by the actions of the oil-rich na-
tions.56 Oil import dependence is a political and economic weakness57
which is necessarily a factor in U.S. policies toward the exporters. Fluc-
tuations in international oil prices have negative economic, political and
international security ramifications,58 and an outright failure to obtain
enough oil from abroad would be a "serious blow" to the American
economy."9 As the threat of disruption in the flow of foreign oil is very
real, the time to take steps to reduce import dependence is now, not when
the oil stops flowing."
Current global dependence on oil as a source of energy necessarily
makes its trade a matter of vital importance to the international commu-
nity, particularly to the principle importing and exporting countries. In-
deed, the trade of oil is the key link between the energy consuming and
energy producing sectors of the global economy. Energy related deci-
sions of the individual nations effect this "global linkage. ' 61 This link,
however, is heavily weighted in favor of the exporting countries, and the
resulting imbalance forces many of the oil consuming nations to avoid
confrontations with their oil-rich suppliers.62 Insofar as oil is a factor in
U.S. foreign policy decisions, national security is negatively impacted by
increased levels of import dependence. As one commentator stated,
"[e]nergy self-reliance - is the forgotten element of our national security
policy."'63
Recognition of the national security aspects of American import de-
pendence is not a recent phenomenon. Indeed, "[n]ational security con-
siderations have always been an important factor in the U.S.
Government's foreign oil policy." 64 In 1944, one commentator advised
that increased American ownership (or control) of foreign oil reserves
would be a desirable policy.65 In July 1950, a committee of the National
Petroleum Council, set up to examine oil import, policy reported that
56 DOUGLAS R. BOHI & W. DAVID MONTGOMERY, OIL PRICES, ENERGY SECURITY, AND
IMPORT POLICY, at xii (1982) [hereinafter BOHI & MONTGOMERY] "[O]ptimal U.S. policy depends
on the behavior of the oil-exporting countries, which is poorly understood." Id.
57 NSIC, supra note 22, at 106.
58 BOHI & MONTGOMERY, supra note 56, at xi.
59 CHESTER, supra note 2, at preface. See also, Bush, supra note 5, at 29.
60 S. SCHURR, supra note 53, at 416. This is particularly true considering that an extensive
time period is required for planning and investment in order to increase the use of non-oil energy
sources. Id.
61 Id. at 415-416.
62 GRIFFIN & TEECE, supra note 12, at 186.
63 Hart, supra note 10, at 280.
64 PETROLEUM INDUSTRY RESEARCH FOUNDATION INC., UNITED STATES OIL IMPORTS: A
CASE STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 59 (1958) [hereinafter PIRF].
65 FEIs, supra note 16, at 19.
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"[imports of crude oil and its products, if increased beyond the limits of
supplementing domestic production, will adversely affect the domestic
industry, the national economy, and national security."66 The Eisen-
hower Administration echoed concerns about the rising U.S. dependence
on foreign oil, specifically noting its potential negative implications for
defense preparedness, but opposed federal government intervention to
address the problem.'
Although national security problems related to import levels were
recognized early, these problems were not taken seriously throughout the
1950s and 1960s. Indeed, until the late 1960s, national security reasons
for restricting oil imports were not legitimate, as no valid threat to im-
port supplies existed.6" Furthermore, the state of domestic supply was
much better, as until the early 1960s a great deal of total oil demand was
met by domestic production. 9 Today, both the sources of U.S. oil im-
ports, and the state of domestic production legitimize national security
concerns over import dependence.
The late 1960s saw the Middle East become a principal supplier of
American oil imports.7° Insofar as energy policy is a factor of foreign
policy, American objectives in the Middle East region reflect its oil
needs. One author has stated the major policy goals of the United States
in the Middle East are "to ensure that the region does not fall under the
control of an outside power hostile to the United States and its allies ...
and to ensure the continued availability of Middle Eastern oil on accepta-
ble terms to our Western European allies and.., to the United States
itself."7 1 Another commentator has identified the following central en-
ergy policy goals. (1) A sufficient and safe supply of petroleum; (2) main-
taining a "reasonable and predictable" price for oil; (3) maintenance of
national security, and (4) the maintenance of viable foreign relations.72
E. Free Market Principles and International Oil
One of the ironies of the oil import problem is that the free market
system, which allowed the United States to establish itself as the world's
dominant economic, political, and military nation, is today threatening
that dominance. The principles and assumptions underlying the free
market do not appear to be capable of dealing with the energy depen-
66 CHESTER, supra note 2, at 22.
67 While House press release, Feb. 26, 1955, in CHESTER, supra note 2, at 30-31.
68 MANCKE, supra note 6, at 15. Most of American imported oil still came from secure
sources, namely the Caribbean or Canada. Id.
69 MOHAMMED E. AHRARI, OPEC THE FALLING GIANT 37 (1986).
70 Id. at 37.
71 JAMES A. BILL & ROBERT W. STOOKEY, PoLrrIcs AND PETROLEUM: THE MIDDLE EAST
AND THE UNITED STATES 165-66 (1975).
72 ROBERT B. KRUEGER, THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL OIL 83 (1975).
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dence and national security problems which result from heavy depen-
dence on foreign oil.73  While the market will generally assure the
availability of reasonably priced oil, it cannot recognize the "costs" of
import dependence.74 In this sense, the free market is simply not capable
of dealing with matters of national security. One commentator has
stated that reliance on the free market in the oil trade leaves importing
economies "vulnerable to... the vicissitudes of Middle Eastern history
and to pure luck.... ."I' Low prices and abundant supply of foreign oil
promote economic growth, but wholly ignore the underlying problem of
energy dependence.76 Indeed, the nature of the import problem is incon-
sistent with the free market, as "security and economic efficiency seldom
coincide."77
Some commentators, rather than finding the free market inadequate
to address the import problem, insist that there is no free oil market.
Control of a large portion of the world's remaining oil reserves by the
OPEC nations prevents the existence of a free market.7" This line of
thought is implicitly founded on the belief that no free market can exist
where output levels and price are within the discretion of the exporting
governments.79 Summarizing this theory, one commentator noted that
"the oil market hasn't operated as Adam Smith envisioned a free market
would."8 0
II. ORGANIZATION OF PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES (OPEC)
A. Introduction
Whether one believes in a free oil market, in the impossibility of a
free oil market, or in some intermediate position, one must take into ac-
count the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).
73 Hart, supra note 10, at 287. "The market does not possess a sense of national urgency." Ia
74 Costs of oil dependence are both financial and non-financial. Large negative balance of pay-
ments and an expanding foreign debt illustrate the financial costs. The national security and foreign
policy implications of oil dependence highlight the non-financial costs.
75 WASH. PosT, Feb. 18-24, 1991, at 29 (Nat'l Week. Ed.).
76 McKie, supra note 51, at 736.
77 Id. at 742. But see Kazi Golam Mohiuddien, The International Oil Market: Analysis and
United States Policy Alternatives, 6 NORTHROP U.L.J. 55, 60 (1985). "The optimal American oil
policy approach is a mixed policy whose primary feature is reliance upon free market mechanisms."
Id. "Through the 1980's, U.S. energy policy was driven by a free-market approach." Kriz, supra
note 52, at 2185.
78 Moore, supra note 8, at 123. See also, S. SCHURR, supra note 53, at 417 ("Oil markets are
not purely competitive"). See also BOHI & MONTGOMERY, supra note 56, at 13 (The oil market is
neither competitive nor monopolistic and therefore does not lend itself to traditional economic
analysis).
79 BILL & STOOKEY, supra note 71, at 171.
80 Kriz, supra note 52, at 2185.
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Since its founding in 1960,"1 OPEC has played a pivotal role in the inter-
national oil market. As one author has written, OPEC is a "well-fi-
nanced, politically savvy, and arguably hostile new world power...., 2
Conclusions about the purpose and utility of OPEC are heavily, if not
completely, dependent on the position one occupies in the international
oil trade. From an importers viewpoint, OPEC is commonly character-
ized as a cartel 3 or a monopoly, the primary function of which is to limit
competition within the international oil market.8'
OPEC was formed on September 10, 1960, in Baghdad, Iraq and in
the ensuing thirty years has become a familiar, but misunderstood en-
tity.85 Originally only composed of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia,
and Venezuela, 6 by November 1973, the founding membership of five
had grown to its present membership of thirteen. 7 In order to gain
membership, a country must have large amounts of net oil exports and
must be approved by three-fourths of the members, including all five of
the founding members.88 Shortly after its founding, the OPEC member-
ship clause was amended to require that a nation wishing to join have
"fundamentally similar interests to those of the member countries. 8 9
The formation of OPEC allowed the oil rich nations to more effectively
use "the oil weapon," and from 1961-73 the member countries set up a
comprehensive organizational network.' As cooperation regarding oil
policy between the OPEC nations increased, oil supply disruptions be-
came "a real and growing possibility." 91 Indeed, beginning in 1971,
OPEC formed a "common front," making importers increasingly suscep-
tible to supply disruptions.92
81 ABDALLAH, supra note 17, at 7.
82 MANcKE, supra note 6, at 3.
83 BILL & STOOKEY, supra note 71, at 172. Yet OPEC characterizes itself as a collection of
sovereign governments looking out for the good of their people. Id See also Norman S. Fieleke, Oil
Shock III?, NEW ENG. ECON. REv. 3, 9 Sept.-Oct. (1990), where OPEC is characterized as a partial
market sharing cartel. See also Mohiuddin, supra note 77, at 55, (defining OPEC as a government
cartel). See also, NSIC, supra note 22, at 2, where OPEC countries are referred to as the greatest
monopoly of all time.
84 Fieleke, supra note 83, at 7.
85 Id. at 6-7. OPEC is a United Nations registered intergovernmental organization. Id
86 ABDALLAH, supra note 17, at 7.
87 BILL & STOOKEY, supra note 71, 110-11; AHRA i, supra note 69, at 183 (The current thir-
teen members of OPEC are Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, United Arab Emirates
[UAE], Qatar, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Indonesia, Gabon and Ecuador).
88 Fieleke, supra note 83, at 7.
89 ABDALLAH, supra note 17, at 7.
90 CHESTER, supra note 2, at 48. In 1962, OPEC resolutions elevated the price of oil to pre-
1960 levels. In 1967, OPEC delegates voted to lift the "selective petroleum embargo" imposed on
the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany. The latter action, naturally, served to increase
net oil exports and revenues. Id
91 MANCKE, supra note 6, at 18.
92 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT THE PRESENT SrruA-
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Ostensibly, OPEC was formed to give the oil-rich nations leverage
against the multinational oil companies which dominated the Middle-
East region throughout the 1940s and 1950s. 91 However, the OPEC
founding documents lay out broader and less self-serving objectives than
are evidenced by the "similar interest" language of the membership
clause. According to its statutes, the primary goals of OPEC are to:
coordinate and unify the petroleum policies of Member countries and
determine the best means for safeguarding their interests, individually
and collectively [and to] devise ways and means of ensuring the stabili-
zation of prices in international crude oil markets with a view to elimi-
nating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations.94
While consuming nations have traditionally harbored considerable
animosity toward the exporting countries, 95 exporting countries had long
complained that they were entitled to a more direct role in the oil trade,
as it is the single most important element of their economies.96 Viewed
in this light, the exporters, through OPEC, are simply exercising rightful
control over what is theirs to control.
The initial period of growth and development prepared OPEC well
for the 1970s, when it would become a true world power. OPEC success
resulted from exploitation of its power over the import dependent coun-
tries, from poor policy of the importers, and from changes in the supply
conditions of the international oil market.97 One such change was that
the 1970's saw the oil market shift from a buyer's market to a seller's
market.91 The power of the exporters during this period is well demon-
strated by the oil crisis of 1973 and 1979, as well as by the per barrel
price of oil. In 1970, OPEC oil was commanding $1.80/barrel on the
market, and in 1980 the same barrel was trading for $32. 99
While OPEC is no longer as visible as it once was, it retains much of
its power to affect, if not determine, the price of international oil. Several
OPEC agreements in the 1970s allowed the exporters to push up the
TION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS, at 77 (1973) [hereinafter OECD]. A supply disruption can result
from technical, commercial or political causes. Commercially caused disruptions are more likely
with OPEC nations working cooperatively. Id
93 See BILL & STOOKEY, supra note 71, at 111. At its inception, OPEC sought to restore
prices to their 1959 level and demand it be consulted in all future price alterations. Id
94 OECD, supra note 92, at 79.
95 AHRARI, supra note 69, at 199.
96 ABDALLAH, supra note 17, at 50.
97 MANCKE, supra 6 note at 93. The latter two factors contributed to the dramatic rise in
world oil price from $1.20/barrel in 1970 to over $1 1/barrel in 1975. Id.
98 NSIC, supra note 22, at 107. See also AHRARI, supra note 69, at 32.
99 KARIM PAKRAVAN, OIL SUPPLY DISRUPTIONS IN THE 1980's 24 (1984). This dramatic rise
in price caused three major changes in the international oil market: a decline in oil demand by
advanced countries, a decline in the growth of oil demand for developing countries, and a 40%
increase in oil production by non-OPEC, non-communist countries. Id
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price of oil, and to "establish itself as a price manipulating entity."' "0
The power and willingness of OPEC to manipulate world oil prices was
extremely pervasive throughout the 1980s, as it decreased production at
times when oil prices were high.10 1 Possession of vast oil reserves gives
the Middle East countries the power to increase or decrease world oil
prices at will.102 The dramatic increase in oil prices following the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait is evidence that OPEC is still a factor in international
oil. 103
B. Mutual Dependence
As a result of the dependence of the industrialized world on oil,
OPEC has political and economic power in the international community.
As vital as oil is to the importing countries, the importance of the oil
trade to the exporting countries is often overlooked. As most of the Mid-
die-Eastern countries rely heavily on oil money for the progress and well-
being of their countries, there is a degree of mutual dependence.1' 4
Seventy-five to eighty percent of OPEC oil goes to North America,
Western Europe, and Japan, constituting 95% of OPEC member ex-
ports. 105 Just as disruptions in supply threaten the economic well being
of the importers, a downward turn in demand for OPEC oil (reduced
exports) could have far reaching economic and political effects on the
exporting nations.1 0 6 Therefore, although the OPEC nations have influ-
ence over the dependent importers, 10 7 heavy dependence on one com-
modity for export revenues is a weakness which can be exploited.108
C. OPEC Oil Revenues
To be sure, OPEC nations have become extremely rich as a result of
the dependence of industrialized economies on foreign oil. Between
100 AHRARI, supra note 69, at 32.
101 Fieleke, supra note 83, at 8. OPEC output tends to be reduced during price rises which is
at least evidence of direct attempts to manipulate price. However, the author doubts the effective-
ness of such price manipulation in the long-term. Id., at 10.
102 Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 3.
103 Jack L. Morvey, Oil and Competition in World Markets, CHICAGO FED LETrER (FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF CHICAGO), Nov. 1990, at 1 (1990). In July 1990, oil was $20 per barrel, but was
nearly $40 per barrel in November. Id
104 BILLY & STooKEY, supra note 71, at 171. See also Susan Dentzer & Carla Robbins, Forget
the Petro Party, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Jan. 14, 1991, at 42. It is noted that increased oil
revenues from high oil prices resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait will be used primarily for
domestic purposes.
105 BILL & STOOKEY, supra note 71, at 116.
106 Id.
107 NSIC, supra note 22, at 110.
108 S. SCHURR, supra note 53, at 417. "[R]educing imports by even a small amount can have
large effects on the receipts of oil exporters ...... Id
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1965-74 OPEC oil revenues increased substantially, from just under $4
billion in 1965 to more than $86 billion in 1974."9 Oil revenues contin-
ued to increase between 1973-79 in all 13 OPEC countries, °10 and in-
creased over three times between 1974-82, from $90.5 billion in 1974 to
$201.9 billion in 1982, peaking at $278.8 billion in 1980."'1 Oil exports
are the major export item for most of the oil-rich nations. In 1979, with
the exception of three members, oil exports represented over 90% of to-
tal exports for each of the OPEC nations.1 12 Increased oil revenues, rep-
resenting huge financial drains on the importers, served to increase the
standard of living in many of the oil-producing nations." 3
Massive OPEC oil revenues have had positive effects within the ex-
porting countries. 114 Short term benefits from large export revenues are
many, but dependence on one commodity for export revenues and heavy
reliance on the West for consumer goods has the OPEC nations scram-
bling to diversify their economies." 5 There is a degree of interdepen-
dence. However, there is a fundamental conflict between the importers
and the exporters: the former must move to reduce dependence, while the
latter are dependent on the oil revenues from exports for progress and
stability.
D. Collective Interests and Member State Interests
Acting in a cooperative arrangement has allowed the exporters to
maximize both revenues, through manipulation of price and political
clout. However, the individual nations remain important within the
OPEC framework. Although each member country clearly benefits from
its association with OPEC, each individual nation still places its individ-
ual goals and policies above any collective goals of OPEC.1 6 The inher-
ent tension between the individual interests and the collective interests is
best expressed as follows:
The point to be stressed here is that such interests may or may not
always coincide. To the extent that the goals (economic or political) of
a given country conform to those of the group, there will be a com-
109 SzYLiowlcz & O'NEILL, supra note 4, at 85; ABRAmi, supra note 69, at 183. See also
BILL & STOOKEY, supra note 71, at 127, estimating that OPEC 1974 revenues were closer to $105
billion. In 1974, $71 billion in oil revenues was taken in by the six major Persian Gulf countries;
Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar. Id
110 AHRARI, supra note 69, at 183 (Total revenues more than doubled, from $90.5 billion in
1974 to $195.2 billion in 1979). See also GHOSH, supra note 8, at 109.
ill AHRARI, supra note 69, at 183.
112 GHosH, supra note 8, at 109.
113 AHRARI, supra note 69, at 199.
114 GHOSH, supra note 8, at 107. See also, ALNASRAW, supra note 5, at 112.
115 GHOSH, supra note 8, at 110.
116 OPEC behavior cannot be correctly understood unless one examines the conflicts and com-
promises of the individual member states. ALNASRAWI, supra note 5, at 3.
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monality of interests and a uniformity of application. The moment the
perception exists that an individual country's interests and goals are
not served by an OPEC decision, however, the interests of that country
can be expected to supersede those of the organization's common
objectives. 117
The formation and continued existence of OPEC has allowed ex-
porters to maximize oil revenues. The first statement issued by OPEC
stressed the importance of oil revenues to the member countries for eco-
nomic development and progress. 118 Soaring oil revenues were inevitable
as world demand for oil tripled between 1955-73, from 15 million barrels
per day (mbd) in 1955 to 45 mbd in 1973.119 The thirst for imported oil
is not limited to the United States; most of the Big Seven industrial coun-
tries import more oil than the United States.1 20
Despite a relative diminution in power, OPEC remains an important
player in the international oil trade and "will play a leading role in shap-
ing the substance of international economic relations for a long time to
come." 121 OPEC will possess substantial power so long as oil remains an
indispensable source of world energy.1 22 The late 1980s have seen a re-
surgence of OPEC from its relative weakness in the beginning of the dec-
ade, although revenues and market share remain well below previous
levels.1 23 OPEC will have power in the future by means of its dominion
over so much of the world's remaining oil reserves. 24 One commentator
117 Id. at 3.
118 ABDALLAH, supra note 17, at 15.
119 AHRARI, supra note 69, at 40.
120 Fieleke, supra note 83, at 7. While four of the Big Seven are more dependent than the
United States, this does not mean these countries import greater volumes of oil. Rather, they import
more oil per billion dollars of gross domestic product. The greater the ratio of imports per billion
dollars of GDP, the greater the degree of dependence. Id at 10. See also, Bill Powell Fire on the
Other Side, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 1991, at 25.
121 MANCKE, supra note 6, at 93. Lack of substitutes for OPEC oil and non-availability of
adequate non-petroleum energy resources dictates that OPEC will have an important role in the
future. Id
122 Dentzer & Robbins, supra note 104, at 44. Following the Mid-East crisis, many of the oil
producing nations will take steps "to establish dominion over oil prices and production. Id See
also, Nick of Time, supra note 8, at 15 (Saudi Arabian official characterized recent oil discoveries as
a guarantee of future international influence).
123 Amuzegar Jahangir, Oil and a Changing OPEC- Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, 27 FIN. & DEy. 43 (1990) (OPEC oil exports increased by more than half from mid 1980s
levels).
124 "Generally accepted forecasts by independent experts that more than 40 per cent of ulti-
mately recoverable oil reserves are to be found in [OPEC] member countries." ALI M. JAIDAH, AN
APPRAISAL OF OPEC OIL POLIcIEs 86 (1983). American oil companies lost most of their Mid-East
oil interests in the late 1970s and early 1980s to nationalization efforts of the exporting countries.
Mark Potts, The Oil Companies' Embarrassment of Riches, WASH. PosT, Feb. 4-10, 1991, at 22
(Nat'l Week. Ed.). See also, Lippman, supra note 1, at 22 (U.S. will remain dependent on large
amounts of imported oil for "years to come.").
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has suggested that OPEC's exercise of power in the future should be
based on international cooperation, as opposed to its confrontational
style of the 1970s.12 Indeed, a truly cooperative approach would help to
stabilize the international oil market, benefitting importers and exporters
alike.
E. OPEC and the United States
OPEC still possesses considerable influence over the United States.
Despite the hard lessons of the embargo, in 1983 nearly two-thirds of all
American oil imports came from OPEC sources, 26 and in 1990 more
than 25% of American imports came from Mid-East sources.1 2 7  In-
creased oil dependence has put a heavy strain on American finances, as
oil imports have substantially increased the total U.S. import bill,'2 ' the
trade deficit, and negative balance of payments. 29
The huge amounts of money paid to the exporters represent trans-
fers of not only financial wealth, but also of political power insofar as
import dependence is an element of foreign policy and a threat to na-
tional security. The current status of American domestic oil production
indicates that the ill effects of import dependence will persist. In 1970,
U.S. production peaked at 9.6 mbd, and has since declined signifi-
cantly. 1 0 In the first six months of 1990, U.S. oil production was at a 26
year low of 7.6 mbd,131 down 5.6% from 1989.132 It is predicted that
domestic production will continue to decline in the 1990s, possibly going
as low as 5.8 mbd by the year 2000.133
125 Cooperation will help OPEC to maintain "an influential market share" in the energy sec-
tor. Rene G. Ortiz, The OPEC Role Until the Year 2000, 8 Fletcher F. 285, 286 (1984). See also
OIF, supra note 34, at 9. Today there is a "greater recognition by OPEC that its interests lie in
market stability rather than instability." Id
126 JAIDAH, supra note 124, at 86.
127 Lippman, supra note 1, at 22.
128 Mohiuddien, supra note 77, at 56 (U.S. exports have not increased enough to offset the
increased levels of imports).
129 Id This effect is not confined to the United States. Aggregate oil debts of other nations,
coupled with American debts, threaten "the collapse of the world economy in the coming decade."
Id
130 Lippman, supra note 1, at 22.
131 Jahangir, supra note 123, at 43.
132 Lippman, supra note 1, at 22.
133 Jahangir, supra note 123. All non-OPEC countries in general are expected to experience
decreases in output levels over the coming decade). Decreased domestic production, even if oil
demand was to remain at current levels, will further import dependence. Id See also, Lippman,
The Oil Shortage is Over, WASH. Posr NAT'L WEEK. ED., Dec. 17-23, 1990, at 20 [hereinafter Oil
Shortage]. Current U.S. consumption is averaging 16.8 mbd. Id.
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III. OIL IMPORT FEES
A. Introduction
An oil import fee could be an effective tool for reducing American
oil imports.134 With only three exceptions, the last twenty years have
provided little incentive to implement measures to reduce dependence on
foreign oil, as the supply of reasonably priced foreign oil has been abun-
dant.135 However, there are urgent political, economic and national se-
curity reasons to make energy independence a national priority.
136
B. History of the Oil Import Fee
The first U.S. attempt to impose a fee on imported oil was the
Fordney-McCumber Tariff bill of 1921. This proposed tariff was intro-
duced primarily to stem the flow of Mexican oil into the United States.1
37
Expecting that such a tax would substantially reduce U.S. oil reserves,
and influenced by oil producers with foreign interests, the Harding ad-
ministration opposed the bill and it failed to pass Congress.1 38 Ironically,
today, supporters of the oil import tariff see the encouragement of do-
mestic production, and thus eventual depletion, as one of its principle
advantages. After two more unsuccessful attempts to tax foreign oil in
1929 and 1930,13' in 1932 Congress passed the first oil import tariff." °
The 1970s saw a recurrence of interest in the oil import fee primarily
as a means of reducing import dependence. Today, crude oil imports are
134 BOHI & MONTGOMERY, supra note 56, at 134. An import fee would also help to reduce the
deficit and slow the growth of the national debt. Oil import fees are often discussed as a means of
increasing federal revenues. Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 11. For a critique of the oil import fee
as a revenue raising device, see, OIF, supra note 34, at 1.
135 Fieleke, supra note 83, at 3. There is ample evidence to show that the recent crisis will not
give incentive to reduce import dependence. See Dentzer & Robbbins, supra note 104, at 43. See
also Electrifying, supra note 26, at 20. While price increases from $20 to $40/barrel are significant,
they are smaller jumps than those experienced in the 1970s, and will not cause substantial decreases
in oil demand. A $1 increase per barrel only decreases U.S. consumption by 63,000 barrels per day.
Id. See also, Mark Potts, All We Have To Fear Is Fear in the Oil Market, WASH. POST NAT'L
WKLY. EDITION, Oct. 8-14, 1990, at 9 [hereinafter Fear]. "It is the anticipation of a shortage, rather
than an actual deficit, that is driving up oil prices." Id See also, Samuelson, supra note 10, at 28
(explaining that no true emergency in oil supply resulted from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and that
the resultant higher prices are "in the realm of inconvenience.").
136 Our reliance on imports is misplaced, as imports are not "inherently reliable" OECD,
supra note 92, at 78.
137 Lawrence, supra note 19, at 103.
138 Id. at 103.
139 Id
140 WILLIAM H. PETERSON, THE QUESTION OF GOVERNMENTAL OIL RESTRICTIONS, 12
(1959) (Contained in the Revenue Act of 1932, it levied a $.21 tax on each barrel of imported oil).
See also, OIF, supra note 34, at 2. This measure was contemplated primarily as a revenue raising
device, not as a means of decreasing import dependence. At the time of its passage, less that 8% of
U.S. oil was imported. Id.
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subject to two minimal charges: (1) an 11.7 cent per barrel tax, and (2) a
duty charge of either 5.25 cents or 10.5 cents per barrel, depending on
the grade of the crude.141
An oil import fee would encourage domestic oil production by mak-
ing it more competitive with OPEC oil and would lower total oil con-
sumption by raising oil prices. Increasing import levels, foreign policy
and national security concerns, and the ever-widening balance of pay-
ments deficits, all give compelling incentive to reduce oil imports. In
1990, the oil picture is as bleak as ever, as shown by the "warning sig-
nals" of the 1990's: sharply rising oil imports, falling domestic oil pro-
duction and limited U.S. refinery capacity. 142
C. GATT and Oil Import Fees
Insofar as an oil import fee would impose a fee upon an item of
international trade, it is important to consider the oil import fee in the
context of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT). The
GATT serves an indispensable role in facilitating equitable trade rela-
tions within the international community. Because an oil import fee
would increase the price of oil imports and encourage the use of domestic
resources, clearly oil exporting countries would object to the imposition
of such a fee. However, to the extent that crude oil is not "bound" under
the GATT, it seems that an oil import fee could be imposed by the
United States without violating any GATT provisions. 143 Furthermore,
if crude oil imports were deemed to be an item subject to GATT jurisdic-
tion, the "Security Exceptions" allowed under Article XXI of the GATT
indicate that an oil import fee could nonetheless be imposed.144
The national security exception provision of the GATT provides
that "[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed.., to prevent any
contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for
the protection of its essential security interests .... ,,4 Conceding that
the broad language of article XXI has rarely been invoked, one commen-
tator has noted that the national security exception language is a loop-
141 OIF, supra note 34, at 4.
142 In 1990, one-half of American oil was imported, with Saudi Arabia being the principle
American supplier. Kriz, supra note 52, at 2183.
143 Memorandum from American Law Division of the Congressional Research Service,
Whether Crude Oil and Petroleum Products are Bound Under the GA 27, at 1 (Mar. 28, 1991) [here-
inafter Crude Oil]. The latest schedule of U.S. tariff concessions submitted to the GAT character-
izes crude oil as not bound by the GAIT. This most recent schedule, however, has not yet been
approved by all of the GAIT Contracting parties. Id.
144 Congressional Research Service, Compatibility of an Oil Import Fee and Certain Domestic
Subsidies with United States obligations under the GA 77 and the United States-Canada Free Trade
Agreement, at 4 (1991) [hereinafter Compatibility].
145 Id. at 4-5.
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hole in the GATT, which could serve as "a tacit justification for any
number of governmental measures." 1"
Under the Article XXI exception, the United States could pursue
the goals of energy independence and security without violating its treaty
obligations under the GATT. Clearly, there is a long standing view that
oil is a crucial element of national security.147 The broad language of
Article XXI and the fact that "it is a matter for the contracting party
itself to define its essential security interests for purposes of the excep-
tion,"' 48 both indicate that an oil import fee is an acceptable measure
under the GATT.
D. Types of Oil Import Fees
There are two types of oil import fees: a unit tax, imposing a fixed
tax per barrel (flat dollar fee) and an ad valorem tax based on the price of
oil.' 49 One recent variation of the unit tax approach is the variable im-
port fee. The traditional flat fee approach and the variable import fee
approach will be examined here.
A flat fee is a fixed per barrel tax and "remains the same regardless
of the price and volume of imports.' 150 On the other hand, a variable
import fee is a flexible tax, and "would be adjusted to whatever level is
necessary to push the price of imported oil to a predetermined
level. . . ."I" This predetermined price would be set at a level high
enough to make domestic oil production competitive with imported
oil. 152 Once a predetermined price level (floor price) is set, a variable
import fee would assure that every barrel cost at least that much. If the
floor price were set at $25, a $20 barrel of oil would be assessed a $5 fee,
while an $18 barrel of oil would be assessed a $7 fee.15 3
146 Id. at 5. "Article XXI exceptions.. .provide a dangerous loophole to the obligations of
GATT." Ia However, it is later noted that "some latitude must be granted for security as opposed
to commercial purpose." Id To this extent, the imposition of an OIF under the article XXI excep-
tion would allow the United States to pursue energy independence and security without violating its
obligations as a party to the GATT. "It is important to note that when Presidents Nixon and Ford
imposed, respectively, license fees and supplemental fees on imported oil in the mid 1970s, the
United States apparently did not notify the GATT, nor were the fees formally challenged by any of
the GAIT parties. Id. at 6.
147 Id. at 6.
148 Id. at 7.
149 Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 11.
150 Joe Barton, Oil Import Fees and U.S. Energy Security, 35 OIL & GAs TAX Q. 30, 42-3
(1986).
151 Id The VIF is a flat rate tax, but the amount of the tax is not constant. OIF, supra note
34, at 4.
152 Id
153 BARTON, supra note 150, at 43. See also OIF, supra note 34, at 4. Computation of the
VIF is actually not this simple. To determine the actual fee amount, knowledge of the price elastic-
ity of demand and supply of imported oil is required. Most bills proposing VIFs have set the floor
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In the 100th Congress, 15 different bills proposing various oil import
fees were introduced. l 4 In the first 6 months of the 101st Congress, nine
bills proposing oil import fees were introduced."I To date, no oil import
measure has gathered sufficient political support for passage.
From a fiscal viewpoint, the flat fee per barrel approach is easier to
calculate and would be a "superior revenue source." '156 It is estimated
that a fee of $5 per barrel would yield $8 billion per year in federal reve-
nues.15 7 This $5 figure is conservative, and most proposed figures for a
flat dollar fee are closer to $10 per barrel.158 A major drawback of the
flat dollar fee is that OPEC (and all oil exporters) could defeat the pur-
pose of such a fee by lowering prices.59 The goal of the flat dollar fee is
to raise the price of imported oil and thus make domestic (and non-
OPEC) oil more competitive. A substantial reduction in price by OPEC,
therefore, would render a flat fee useless as a means of reducing imports.
On the other hand, a variable import fee (VIF) is not susceptible to
this sort of undercutting." Because the VIF is tied to a trigger price
(floor price), even if OPEC were to reduce prices, the reduction in price
would be "recaptured" by the fee. 61 The VIF would raise the price of
all oil and would encourage investment in alternative sources of energy
which would be competitive with oil, thus decreasing dependence on oil,
in general, as a source of energy.162
E. Disadvantages of an Oil Import Fee
Increased oil prices resulting from an import fee could reduce the
degree of import dependence, but there would be negative side effects.
An oil import fee would "depress economic activity, raise inflation, have
an uneven effect on different states, and hurt poor people relatively more,
price between $18-$26. For simplicity's sake, the concept is presented here for illustrative purposes
only.
154 OIF, supra note 34, at 3. Between 1985-89, Congress considered and rejected oil import fee
proposals on four separate occasions. Id.
155 Id. at 13-14.
156 Barton, supra note 150, at 43.
157 Id. at 38 (explaining that U.S. Crude Oil Production would be higher with a $5 per barrel
import fee). See also, OF, supra note 34, at 1.
158 PAKRAVAN, supra note 99, at 59; see also, BOHI & MONTGOMERY supra note 56, at 134.
159 PAKRAVAN, supra note 99, at 43.
160 Lawrence, supra note 19, at 112.
161 Barton, supra note 150, at 43. See also, Harold T. Ross & Bernard L. Wunstein, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 3, 1990, at 5 col 2. The variable import fee, "sliding scale oil import fee" is the best
way to stabilize world oil prices. Id.
162 This is not to say that alternative energy sources can deliver energy independence, as most
remain prohibitively expensive. See Electrifying, supra note 26, at 20 (Even at $40 per barrel, oil is a
more economical than most alternative energy sources). See also, Energy Policy, supra note I, at I
("Environmental priorities are diminishing the likelihood of increased use of coal, but are brighten-
ing the prospects for natural gas, and possibly the nuclear option.").
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than others." '163 These and related concerns have led one commentator
to state that despite the substantial support of the domestic petroleum
industry, there are "strong reservations about the wisdom of an oil im-
port fee and even stronger skepticism about its workability."'1 "
Although an oil import fee could have the positive effect of closing
the price gap between American and imported oil, it would have the neg-
ative effect of raising prices and increasing the costs of oil generated en-
ergy and energy intensive industries.16 Such increased costs would
render American goods less competitive on the global market.16
F. Advantages of an Oil Import Fee
The principle advantages of an oil import fee/tariff are best summa-
rized as follows:
It will tend to make new domestic oil production and production of
energy from alternative sources (such as shale, coal, or sunlight) more
profitable, discourage consumption through higher energy prices, re-
duce imports and thereby improve the balance of payments and in-
crease security of supply, and possibly help reduce world oil prices by
reducing demand for OPEC oil.167
An oil import fee could reduce import dependence by raising the
price of oil168 and thus reducing oil consumption.1 69 By raising the price
of a barrel of foreign oil, an oil tariff could make domestic exploration
163 OilF, supra note 34, at 2. An oil import fee would reduce Gross National Product (GNP),
real income, employment, and production. Id. at 11. Damage to U.S. economic performance could
be limited by phasing in the import fee. Id. at 1. However, such a phasing in would only prolong
the inevitable inflationary effects. Id. at 10.
164 64 Platt's Oilgrain News 2, Amoco's Morrow Warns of Danger of US. Energy Direction,
Oct. 6, 1986. The domestic oil industry is not united on this issue. See, OIF, supra note 36, at 3.
Generally, producers (drillers) are in favor of the import fee, while refiners, (who buy oil form
outside sources), oppose any import tax. Id. See also, Thomas W. Lippman, Even the Best Ideas
Aren't Always Fuelproof, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 1-7, 1990 at 33 (Nat'l Week. Ed.) [hereinafter
Fuelproof]. Consumer behavior, political upheaval in the oil rich nations and technological advances
are all factors to be considered in taxing energy. Id.
165 Id. at 33. General "carbon tax" on coal, oil and natural gas "would undermine U.S. manu-
facturers by driving up the cost of their products." Id, However, phased in over a 10 year period, it
is believed that a carbon tax could reduce energy consumption by 23%, while lowering real gross
national product by only one percent. Id.
166 MbANcKE, supra note 6, at 2.
167 KRUEGER, supra note 72, at 190. Decreased world oil prices would benefit the less devel-
oped importing countries as well. PAKRAvAN, supra note 99, at 59. Lowering energy costs could be
"a less costly and less disruptive way to fulfill humanitarian impulses toward lesser developed na-
tions .... ." S. SCHURR, supra note 53, at 418.
168 Samuelson, supra note 10, at 28. Higher prices work to reduce dependence in several ways.
In the short term, consumption is lower. In the long term, energy efficiency is increased. Id.
169 Higher prices resulting from an energy tax could reduce U.S. consumption by as much as
500,000 barrels per day. Id
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and production more economically feasible.17 While the import fee is
not without critics, skeptics concede that an oil tariff could have the dual
effect of reducing consumption levels and encouraging production of do-
mestic oil.' Increased domestic production would not be sufficient to
fully meet current (or future) demand,'72 but increased development of
domestic resources would be an important step toward reducing long
term oil import dependence.' 73
The recent Gulf crisis highlighted the vulnerability of American oil
dependence. It is imperative that the United States develop and imple-
ment a comprehensive energy policy to reduce import dependence and to
prepare for the eventual depletion of world oil supply. 74 An oil import
fee is one of the most effective anticipatory methods available to reduce
Western thirst for imported oil as it could reduce energy consumption,
and make economical the exploitation of the domestic energy resources
of the importing countries.' 75
Dependence on foreign oil made many of the importing countries
reexamine energy policies in the 1970s and 1980s, in order to reduce de-
pendence on foreign oil.'76 However, dependence on imported oil has
continued to rise. The oil import fee offers a viable means of increasing
170 Barton, supra note 150, at 30. Imported oil is the benchmark for domestic oil prices. Do-
mestic oil prices would rise approximately the same amount as imported oil. OIF, supra note 34, at
10.
171 BOHI & MONTGOMERY, supra note 56, at 135. However, it is empirically difficult to pre-
dict the effects of an oil tariff, since supplier reaction will play an important role. Id. See also
PAKRAVAN, supra note 99, at 58-9 ("Anticipatory Policies" for reduction of oil imports and in-
creased flexibility of energy use).
172 It seems doubtful that the gap between demand and domestic supply could ever be closed.
See Lippman, supra note 1, at 22. The U.S. Energy Department estimates maximum U.S. produc-
tion at 9.4 mbd. Given current demand levels of nearly 17 mbd, "[i]t is not a question of whether we
can eliminate imported oil, but whether we can stop our dependence from growing. Oil experts agree
there is no plausible combination of increased U.S. oil production and reduced consumption that will
make substantial inroads on U.S. import dependence in this decade. The gap between production
and consumption can be narrowed, but imported oil-much of it from the Middle-East will remain an
essential economic lifeline." Id.
173 "Chipping away at a huge problem can produce large chips, even if they seem insignificant
compared to what is left." Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 3.
174 PAKRAVAN, supra note 99, at 58. "Anticipatory policies" are vital to reducing import
dependence. In the process of preparing for depletion, vulnerability to import supply disruptions
would decrease. Id. Enacting an energy tax in the past would have served to "promote conservation
and to insulate the U.S. market from the wild swings of world oil prices." Samuelson, supra note 10,
at 28.
175 PAKRAVAN, supra note 99, at 58-9. See also, Energy Policy, supra note I at 11. "Raising
oil prices - the benchmark for the price of other energy resources - is one effective way to conserve
energy .... [and] stimulate the domestic oil producing industry." Id.
176 ALNASRAWI, supra note 5, at 115. Numerous measures were taken by the importing coun-
tries in the 1970s and early 1980s to increase energy independence. Id Energy policy has been
defined as "a set of governmental actions designed to be consistent and comprehensive in dealing
with difficult energy-related issues that will permanently be with us." KRUEGER, supra note 72, at
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energy independence. The advantages of an oil import fee include: (a)
encouraging domestic production by raising oil prices, and (b) helping
avoid the inflation and unemployment problems which would accom-
pany a significant disruption in supply at current import levels.' 77
In addition to making American oil more competitive, an oil import
fee would have other positive effects. Indeed, it would help to prepare
the oil dependent nations for a supply disruption and attract investments
that would reduce consumption. 17  Insofar as domestic and other non-
OPEC oil would become more economically competitive, dependence on
OPEC oil would decrease and our vulnerability to a supply disruption
would be reduced.
An import fee would help put U.S. and other non-OPEC producers
on equal footing with OPEC suppliers, who presently enjoy the advan-
tage of substantially lower production costs. 179 Indeed, "cheap foreign
oil has virtually halted new domestic oil exploration and led to abandon-
ment of thousands of marginally productive wells."'' 0 In December
1985, the number of functioning oil rigs was 1,898. It dropped to 697 by
June of 1986.181 By increasing the price of imports, non-OPEC oil will
become more competitive, and higher production costs will no longer act
as a disincentive to domestic exploration and production.
When discussing the issue of taxing imported oil, there are two con-
flicting interests, namely, "the economic benefits of cheap world oil ....
[and] the economic costs of oil supply disruptions."'8 2 The inclination
towards letting the free market dictate energy policy is dangerous, since
free market principles are not capable of recognizing the long-term impli-
cations of energy dependence. An oil import fee would be a bold step, as
it would eschew cheap imported oil for the greater good of increased
energy independence. To be sure, an oil import fee will cost the United
States, but the risks of energy dependence and supply disruptions
83. Recent Persian Gulf crisis will force U.S. government to review energy policy "in all its aspects
with a new focus." Energy Policy, supra note 1, at 1.
177 It is estimated that unemployment would increase by 6 percent and inflation would ap-
proach 20 percent if import supplies were interrupted at current levels. Lawrence, supra note 19, at
114-5. Oil supply disruptions effect different sectors of the economy differently, depending on that
sector's relative energy dependence and its ability to increase oil/energy efficiency. Morvey supra
note 103. "Energy efficiency matters as much as dependency." Powell, supra note 120, at 25. Ja-
pan, whose overall energy efficiency is twice that of the United States as a result of an aggressive
conservationist energy policy, will suffer less from increased oil prices. Id.
178 BOHI & MONTGOMERY, supra note 56, at 135.
179 Barton, supra note 150, at 31. Barton points out that oil production costs in the North Sea
are forty times those associated with Saudi Arabian oil fields. Id.
180 Lawrence, supra note 19, at 100.
181 Id. at 101.
182 Barton, supra note 150, at 40.
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threaten to cost much more. 183
III. CONCLUSION
Imposition of an oil import fee could be an effective way to reduce
(or slow) ever growing American dependence on foreign oil by raising
the price of oil, and encouraging domestic production. Given limited
U.S. oil reserves, some degree of oil import dependence is inevitable. To-
day, American oil import dependence has reached alarming levels.
Without swift federal intervention to address the import problem, U.S.
import dependence will continue to increase. Continuing an energy pol-
icy which relies on the free market will further reduce domestic produc-
tion and will result in the United States importing more than half of its
oil needs in the very near future.
There is strong support for both sides of the oil import fee debate.
Clearly, the imposition of an import fee would negatively impact Ameri-
can economic performance. However, a substantial disruption in supply
at current (or increased) import levels would have devastating economic
consequences as well. While an import fee could be phased in, and its
negative effects anticipated, a disruption in supply would be sudden and
unannounced.
It is easy for energy policy makers and legislators to choose cheap
foreign oil (and its many benefits) instead of taking up the difficult task of
formulating a comprehensive energy policy to reduce dependence on oil
imports. Indeed, it is an extremely difficult problem, with no easy solu-
tion. On a purely economic scale, the short run disadvantages of an im-
port fee outweigh the long term advantages of increased energy
independence and security. However, a strict economic analysis is short-
sighted and dangerous. The long run risks of continued oil import de-
pendence are greater than any short term losses in economic perform-
ance. It is imperative that the United States take a step towards greater
energy independence and the oil import fee is a hard choice whose time
has come.
Gregory M. Scanlon*
183 An import fee would cost jobs, increase inflation and result in higher oil and fuel prices.
Stepped up domestic production would create new jobs.
* J.D. Candidate, Case Western Reserve School of Law, (1992).
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